Live Encounters Magazine Special Edition April 2025.
Space Policy and International Relations Theory by Dr. Namrata Goswami. – Article Two
Space is a global endeavor. This is an important fact that needs to be internalized. Once a nation has developed its space capacities, it implies three things: an ability to launch to space; an ability to maintain a constellation of satellites in space, and an ability to utilize those assets for its national development, its military capacity, and its global power projection. As a result, when we even think about space forces, their ability to project power is global. Added to these aspects are those nations that go beyond satellites, to develop space missions that can go to the Moon and Mars with orbiters and landers, build space stations, and bring back samples from an asteroid. Those are the Great Powers. Space’s global character also means that the regulatory and normative frameworks for space governance have to be truly global in character.
I have written on how the space policy process unfolds. In that article, I define space policy as a process of developing, prioritizing, and implementing a plan of action developed by the government entity entrusted with the task. The first stage is problem identification, the second stage is policy formulation, the third stage is policy adoption, the fourth stage is policy implementation, and, finally, policy evaluation.
[1] However, space policy occurs within the context of how Great Powers, Middle Powers, and Emerging Powers in space, develop their space programs, what missions they prioritize, and what capacities they aspire to develop. The end goals of space policies matter, meaning the goals nations set for themselves. In this, I argue that current international relations theorizing can explain some of the variations in the process of how space affects foreign policy, military strategy, civilian capacities, and power projection.
The four theories I utilize in this article are realism, liberalism, constructivism, and critical theory. I chose these four theories because they provide a sound foundational basis for explaining state actions, motivations, and how these theories would view the development of space policy.
For realism, the principal actors in the international system are states. States, in this construction of reality, are focused on their security, and national interests and struggle for relative power advantage in the system. Realists are skeptical of the power of norms, especially those who are of the classical variety. Western classical realists like Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Eastern classical realists like Kautilya, and Sun Tzu, all believe that norms and moral judgment have to be based on prudence. There is unity in classical realist thinking that the actions of the state, if based on moral legitimacy, create support and advance the goals of that state even more broadly. However, the goal of the state is self-aggrandizement and expansion of its power, regime structure, and value system. Within Realism, there are defensive and offensive realists as well. Defensive Realists argue that states are security-seeking, and focus on ensuring that they maximize their security and address uncertainties, especially those that can lead to a security dilemma. In space policy, for instance, defensive realists would assert that the U.S. and China can engage in cooperation in space by removing the uncertainties that could plague their space programs. Moreover, in their perspective, since states are security-seeking and not looking to dominate, once we address those insecurities, everything will be well. But then there is offensive realism that argues that states are power-seeking, aspire to different versions of what an international order led by them would result in, and are not motivated to engage or collaborate in meaningful ways but instead compete to get maximum relative power. Moreover, U.S. efforts to engage China, including such efforts as the G2 are viewed by China as attempts by the U.S. to drag China and the Communist Party of China (CPC) into a West-led international order,[2] where China will play second fiddle. This includes China’s space policies and goals. From an Offensive Realist perspective, states compete for dominance and will very rarely accept a cooperative compromise that does not forward their value system and goals. In terms of space policy, we witness this in the way Great Powers like the U.S. and China are framing their development of permanent presence on the Moon. Or how India, vying for Great Power status, is starting to conceptualize space as a vital critical infrastructure and forwarding an Indian philosophical and grand strategic understanding of space; specifically, how India’s achievements in space, including going to the Moon being a benefit that India would bestow to the world. China, especially the CPC, also has a very similar narrative about China’s investments in space as a contribution to the Chinese way of civilization ethos and the Chinese dream, where Chinese values dominate. When we draw our gaze to realist thinkers like Sun Tzu and Kautilya, the strategic and philosophical are always interweaved into their administrative manuals for how the state could develop its capacities for optimal tactical and strategic advantage. For Kautilya, it was Yogokshema or the welfare of the people that a king always had to keep in mind; for Sun Tzu, the commander of the armies should not only have intelligence-based operations but must have the moral high ground. However, ultimately, the self-aggrandizing state, under a competent ruler, was what they both favored. In some sense, Machiavelli also had similar advice for the Medici, on how to wield power and when to use it, and how the ruler has to develop competencies. All these three thinkers played the role of advisors, hoping that their advice was heeded, by the King, amongst many others. Realism has a rich tradition of assessing and examining human nature and does have one of the best theoretical explanations of state action, once you broaden its strategic and philosophical base.
The second international relations theory that impacts how space policy is conceptualized is liberalism. Gandhi was a foremost liberal thinker who believed that we can change human behavior by focusing on their world views. He argued that this can lead to the transformation of the human spirit. This is how he saw India’s independence movement against British colonial rule that ravaged India for nearly 200 years (1757-1947). For Gandhi, it was not the British that was the issue; it was their worldview that enabled this kind of inhuman exploitation of another society. Liberalism believes in the emancipation of the human spirit, and that we can transform human motivations and incentives for a better future. This can be done by building cooperative institutions, engaging in dialogue that can develop meaning together, and that differences do not necessarily result in violent conflict. Bargaining and negotiations for common norms, treaties, guidelines, and standard operating principles can be developed in international relations for states to function well. Like realism, liberalism does believe that the state is the prime actor in the international system. This theoretical framework has faith in the ability of institutional collaborative structures to mitigate competition and enable collaboration. Regarding space policy, it would mean enhancing treaties like the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, establishing norms around responsible behavior in space, building ethical standards on how space exploration should be conducted, and the importance of discussions at the level of the United Nations on the issue of utilization of space resources. For liberalism, conflict is not inevitable in the international system because collaborative structures can help resolve violent differences. Michael Walzer, a theorist on Just War, argues that normative frameworks like Just War that offer key principles on what is a just cause of war, and on issues of proportionality and discrimination, offer framing guidance to address and mitigate conflicts. There are deep philosophical traditions across Asia, Africa, and indigenous communities in Latin America that have developed sophisticated systems of thought to address the complexities around how conflicts can be avoided.
Then there is constructivism, which argues that international relations are shaped by social factors like ideas and interactions and not so much by material factors like power differentiation, military forces, and economic development. Constructivism focuses on the agency of individual actors in shaping international events. Reality, in the Constructivist worldview, is socially constructed and not materially determined, by the meaning one attaches to them. For instance, about space, an anti-satellite weapon, if acquired by the United Kingdom, would not be seen as such a threat, by the United States, as the ASAT capability acquired by China in 2007. The material power of both those ASATs is the same, but then the whole story changes regarding the intention of why those states have them, and critically, who has them. For constructivists, states assume identities based on their interactions with other states in the system. And then those constructed identities create interests and the agendas that states adopt. This can be observed in how Great Powers, Middle Powers, and Emerging Powers view space policy and the capacity it brings. A Middle Power is focused on how it can influence the Great Powers and their space policies; a Great Power is interested in how its investments in space, either maintain or expand its overall security or power and influence in the international system. Constructivists give value to social norms and the logic of appropriate behavior. Norms, to be effective, have to be adopted by a majority of states, for instance, space norms like responsible behavior concerning how space can be kept free of weaponization, or a space norm around a mortarium on ASAT weapons.
These three international relations theories can offer explanations on state actions and adoption in regard to certain space policies. Finally, of course, there is critical theory. The two Western philosophers who influenced critical theory were Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx, both philosophers. Critical theorists view international relations through a perspective of a deep-seated interplay between state, sub-state, and non-state forces that intersect in the cultural, economic, and social spheres. Robert Cox, for instance, challenged the universalist assumptions behind realism and liberalism by stating that the question we should ask is what theory, why, and for what purpose? He stated that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose’.[3] The idea of emancipation as a universal ideal is challenged, and instead critical theory argues that we need to shed light on how such an abstract universal idea can exclude, and create legitimate political arrangements that can be deeply hierarchical. We also should examine how some races, genders, and other identities are deliberately excluded by realism and liberalism’s privileged systems of international order. Andrew Linkletter and Robert Cox both believe that inter-state relations can neither be understood nor explained without understanding the social forces that shape them. There are no absolute truths. This is very Gandhian, given Gandhi’s reflections on truth and his philosophy that we all have our path to our unique truths. Critical theorists argue that the present international order has been brought into existence by powerful state actors with vested interests and therefore is deeply unequal, when we think about the knowledge systems, the university systems, and the groups of communities, it privileges to the sheer neglect of other sources of knowledge. Andrew Linkletter, for instance, sheds light on the idea of citizenship, whose citizen we are, the inherent limitations that coerce humanity into, and the entitlements it brings to some states over others. To Linkletter, citizenship has divided people into national communities and therefore has created a deep-seated obstacle to the emergence of a truly global consciousness.[4] I argue that recognizing the limitations and requirements imposed by a security-maximizing or power-maximizing state is something that could broaden the depth of critical theory, which some critical theorists recognize.[5]
In terms of norms and space policy and behavior, ideas like responsibility, a guide to state behavior, and the movement toward building universal codes of conduct in space will be challenged by critical theorists. In their reflection, they would argue that “whose norms are we talking about here, really?”, and whose hidden hegemonic agenda is being served by these efforts towards a code of conduct in space? This was what played out during the discussions on developing a European Code of Conduct for Outer Space, developed in 2008 and amended in 2010. The effort however failed in 2011 due to the resistance of the Global South countries who argued that a Code of Conduct without legal enforceability is meaningless. Moreover, the nations, during the negotiation process, stated that such an EU-originated Code of Conduct could limit their space activities and tie them to processes that could prove detrimental to their societies. Countries like China, Brazil, and India indicated that such a code of conduct might diminish the global effort toward an actual treaty that would be required to prevent an arms race in space. Countries clashed on the issue of self-defense, which the code identified as an exception to the use of force. Moreover, as is the case with almost all conversations and drafts that are utilized to start such normative conversations, the EU Code of Conduct in space, while being inclusive in its process of consultation, had already arrived for these discussions, with a draft core code already written, thereby framing the consultative discussions in a particular way. This, most Global South, countries felt, was a fait accompli.[6] Medha Bisht and I have written a piece on space norms and international relations theory that highlight some of the issues with norm generation.[7]
In conclusion, the ability of international relations theory to explain and understand space policy and its processes, the power projection capability of space assets, and the normative dimension is rather rich. What we need is the ability to develop a universal knowledge base drawn from different cultures, policies, and capacities to strengthen those theoretical foundations. Knowledge systems are never finite; nor do they base themselves on absolute truths. That is what we need to consciously develop; knowledge systems that will stand the test of time, utilizing the rather new international relations discipline but supplementing it with the ancient knowledge systems of history, logic, culture, strategy, and philosophy.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.
[1] Namrata Goswami, “Space Policy: Why a Step-by-Step Plan Matters”, The Space Review, March 27, 2023, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4554/1#:~:text=Namrata%20Goswami%2C%20Ph.,the%20Resources%20of%20Outer%20Space.
[2] Michael Beckley, “The Flaws of Defensive Realism and the False Promise of Re-engaging China”, Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, n.d., https://sais.jhu.edu/kissinger/programs-and-projects/kissinger-center-papers/flaws-defensive-realism-and-false-promise
[3] Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10/2, 1981, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/03058298810100020501
[4] Andrew Linklater, Critical Theory and World Politics Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity (London and New York, Routledge, 2007).
[5] Marcos Ferias Ferreira, “Introducing Critical Theory in International Relations”, E-International Relations, February 18, 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/18/introducing-critical-theory-in-international-relations/#google_vignette
[6] “Code of Conduct on Space Activities: Unsolved Critiques and the Question of its Identities”, Foundation for Strategic Research, n.d., https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/notes/code-conduct-space-activities-unsolved-critiques-and-question-its-identity-2015
[7] Medha Bisht and Namrata Goswami, “Can Outer-Space Norms be Universal: Conversations with International Relations Theories”, Social Science Research Network, December 2, 2024, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4965688
© Dr. Namrata Goswami
Dr. Namrata Goswami is an author and educator specializing in space policy, international relations, and ethnic identity. Currently, Dr. Goswami teaches at the Schriever and West Space Scholar Programs, the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Thunderbird School of Global Management, Arizona State University, and at the Joint Special Forces University. She is a guest lecturer at Emory University for seminars on Technology, Society & Governance, and India today. She worked as a Research Fellow at MP-Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi; a Visiting Fellow at Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway; La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia; University of Heidelberg, Germany; Jennings-Randolph Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace; and was a Fulbright Senior Fellowship Awardee. She was awarded the Minerva grant by the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense to study great power competition in outer space.
In April 2019, Dr. Goswami testified before the U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission on China’s space program. Her co-authored book, Scramble for the Skies: The Great Power Competition to Control the Resources of Outer Space was published in 2020 by Lexington Press; Rowman, and Littlefield. Her book on The Naga Ethnic Movement for a Separate Homeland was published in 2020 by Oxford University Press. She has published widely including in The Diplomat, the Economic Times, The Washington Post, Ad Astra, Asia Policy, Live Encounters Magazine, Cairo Review. She was invited in November 2019 to share about her life and her work at a Tedx event held at the Rosa Parks Museum, in Montgomery, Alabama. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5WPNdnahLaY