Live Encounters Magazine Volume One November-December 2024.
Influence Operations in Academia: The Indian Context
by Dr. Param Sinha Palit & Tejusvi Shukla.
China’s ‘influence operations’ in academia have been rising, disconcerting academic communities and their respective governments worldwide. Defined by RAND as ‘the collection of tactical information about an adversary as well as the dissemination in propaganda in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent,’ the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been targeting the Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) and Research Performing Organizations (RPOs) abroad to manipulate and influence foreign students and their faculty.[1] The influence campaigns are aggressive and extensive in countries like the United States (US), where China competes for global leadership in technology and education, raising international apprehension. India, another robust democracy, has also been experiencing Chinese ‘influence’ in its academic institutions.
China’s global ambition to emerge as a superpower by 2049 has partly pushed the Chinese leadership to urge the CCP ‘to pick flowers in foreign lands to make honey in China,’ which fits well with the Party’s long-term agenda. Beijing has been employing Confucius Institutes (CI) as propaganda tools in American HEIs while deploying Talent Programs – targeting and recruiting US-based researchers and scientists with access to America’s cutting-edge research and technology.[2] On the contrary, Beijing’s influence operations, which are gradually picking up in India, are not only distinct but low-key compared to the US. China’s influence in the Indian academia is partly driven by the two countries’ awkward history and the long-standing border dispute.[3] This paper is an effort to analyze Beijing’s growing influence operations, particularly in the Indian academia, while seeking to highlight India’s responses.
Scholarships, Confucius Institutes, & Cultural Exchanges raise concerns.
The Indian academia has been increasingly vulnerable to Chinese influence in recent times. These vulnerabilities have been multiple and range from impacting different sections within the academia, including students and the faculty. Actors outside the academic hold, directly influencing the academia – in think tanks, media, and cultural forums – have equally been vulnerable and targeted. The overarching concern is that despite the existing threats to the targeted actors, they mostly remain unaware of the gravity of the threats. Consequently, the preventive measures and preparedness strategies remain inadequate, particularly the standard best practices.
To view the existing threats, we seek to study them based on the sections within the Indian academic circles targeted through several seemingly benign initiatives and interactions. For assessment, these vulnerable sections may be identified as students and research scholars, academic institutions, and other influence groups. While all others are self-explanatory, the ‘other influence groups’ include the media, cultural associations/forums, and similar allied groups. This latter group – the ‘other influence groups’ – while not essentially a part of the Indian academia, hold close and regular interactions and exchanges with the academia, influencing their thinking and impacting academicians as well as policymakers.
Regarding influence on students and research scholars, vulnerabilities are varied and distinct.[4] For example, the interaction of Indian students with Chinese actors happens through multiple mediums. Not restricted to scholarships, exchange programs, language training courses, and cultural and youth forums, a few China Centers within Indian universities have been equally responsible for playing critical roles in influencing and manipulating the more prominent academia. While not all of these initiatives are involved in activities contradicting Indian interests, the potential threats that they pose in other countries must be cautiously noted.[5]
Several scholarships – Ministry of Commerce scholarship, Belt and Road Initiative scholarship, International Students’ scholarship, Confucius Institutes scholarship, and the like – which China offers to Indian students are a cause for concern, given their potential to misguide and manipulate them in their campuses. While most of these scholarships are provided through an Education Exchange Programme (EEP) – signed between the two countries in 2006 to facilitate educational cooperation – the Chinese academic surveillance and interference in countries like the US cause suspicion in India.[6]
Besides regular degree and exchange semester programs, the Chinese government also organizes fully funded summer school camps at Chinese universities to facilitate ‘cultural exchanges’ between their university students and foreign students. It is concerning that standard mechanisms for training visiting students at Chinese universities against propaganda and influence operations are not in place – thus making them easy targets in Chinese HEIs. Many Indian students are lured and encouraged to work for leading state-affiliated media agencies like CGTN and China Radio International (CRI).[7]
The CIs – known for being the propaganda arms of the CCP – in India, after being under the government scanner following the Galwan clashes of 2020, continue to remain operational though few. The CIs’ limited numbers in India, compared to their presence in other parts of the world, is because they have been looked at suspiciously from the beginning.
Currently, two Centres are operational in universities in India: the University of Mumbai (established in 2013 through an agreement with Hanban, China)[8] and Vellore Institue of Technology Vellor,[9] Tamil Nadu (started as a Chinese language Centre in 2009[10], followed by a CI established in 2012). Five others have been approached for collaboration since 2017: Lovely Professional University, Jalandhar; OP Jindal Global University, Sonepat; School of Chinese Language, Kolkata; Bharathiar University, Coimbatore; and KR Mangalam University, Gurugram. Lovely Professional University has an operational Chinese Language Centre on campus.[11] Unfortunately, details of the establishment of the Centre and the curriculum are not available on its website,[12] raising doubts. Post-Galwan, they have been brought under the strict Foreign Contributions Regulations Act (FCRA) regulations.[13] Their funds and functioning are not only regularly scrutinized, but they are constantly monitored by the government as well.
Besides this, several Indian universities also offer Chinese language courses with Chinese, Taiwanese, and Indian-origin faculties visiting Indian campuses. However, standard mechanisms and best practices for ensuring Indian students are not exposed to any unwanted, orchestrated propaganda during such classes appear generally absent. Subtle sandwiching of propaganda during such language programs is not uncommon and holds potential risks of influencing and manipulating them. Through interviews held by the authors, it was found that themes of China’s ‘cultural superiority’ and ‘unnecessary/manufactured apprehensions about benign Chinese cultural initiatives’ by the Indian government are commonly mentioned and discussed during these classes.
In terms of influencing HEIs and RPOs, cultivating influential people with the offer of grants and funds is not only one of the most viable means to generate goodwill.[14] Still, it is also deployed to ‘influence’ and ‘initiate’ particular pro-China narratives. These are also undertaken through masked official channels like the Little Red Schools, CIs, Culture Centers, Chinese-funded programs, courses, etc. While these masked channel-driven influence operations are not country-specific[15], countries, including India, look at them suspiciously. Given their complicated relationship, actions like these raise questions regarding China’s intentions to fund research and scholars in India. Meanwhile, China’s expanding influence within South Asia has further upset India since such a Chinese presence is considered a ploy to destabilize the region. Whether Nepal or Bangladesh, China’s foothold in the area is increasing trepidation, competition, and confrontation between the two biggest Asian powers.
Regarding the ‘other influence groups,’ think tanks and journalists are the primary targets. This is in galore globally, with no exceptions in South Asia. The Nepal-China Forum is a classic example highlighting Chinese tendencies to engage local faculties for influence-building.[16] The forum’s founder is an alumnus of the premier Fudan University in Beijing and has been recognized by the Chinese government for his outstanding contribution to Nepal-China relations since 2020. He is also a visiting faculty member at Kathmandu University, facilitating interactions and exchanges between China and the local university students in Nepal.[17]
Beijing’s efforts to alter its negative global image exude influence-building tendencies.
Beijing’s growing negative global image has been pushing the government to take measures to improve its reputation, both globally and regionally. The CCP’s pursuits to influence news consumers worldwide have been one of their primary tools and have been elaborately studied by international organizations. Freedom House’s report titled “Global Media Influence” (2022) studies China’s media campaign to influence news consumers worldwide. It discusses how the CCP employs its media to circulate alternate narratives favoring the Party.[18]
Along with its massive media campaign, Beijing also runs academic programs for HEIs and RPOs, employing academic exchanges and collaborations to engage with international scholars and experts. For example, in November 2019, the Xinhua News Agency and Communication University of China (CUC) organized an ‘International Think Tank Experts’ short-term Visiting Program in Beijing and Zhejiang province, inviting experts from around 50 countries, including South Asia.[19] The program aims to raise awareness and develop knowledge on the contentious BRI, which can be termed ‘benign,’ highlighting Beijing’s positive tendencies. However, given China’s recourse to coercion and negative actions to change target states’ behavior, the underlying hostile intent behind the program cannot be ruled out.[20]
It can be argued that these efforts targeting Indian academia and allied influence groups are majorly aimed at creating a favorable image for China amidst strained relations with the government. This includes New Delhi’s reactions post Galwan clashes as well as its refusal to join the BRI, among other areas of concern.[21] This has been a typical Chinese strategy that the CCP deploys to help the Beijing leadership manipulate the targeted audience. This Chinese tendency to shape and reframe narratives was overtly conspicuous during the pandemic.[22]
As for influencing journalists, starting in 2016, China’s foreign ministry has hosted 10-month-long fellowships for around 100 foreign journalists from leading Asian and African media organizations annually.[23] This has recorded participation from prominent Indian media houses, including the Indo-Asian News Service (IANS), the Indian Express, and the Jansatta, a Hindi-language newspaper owned by the Indian Express Group. Participating journalists are provided handsome stipends and residential accommodation in Beijing, and they are offered language classes and a degree from a Chinese university. Taking cognizance of these developments, the Indian embassy in Beijing has identified and kept them away from its official events due to the underlying security concerns. At the same time, the journalists remain accredited under the fellowship.
Several shocking scandals involving the Indian media, including social media, have further made situations mirky in recent years.[24] There have been claims that China-linked sources had not only paid Indian journalists and online media outlets to turn in sensitive information but have pushed them to promote CCP narratives as well. In September 2020, the Delhi Police’s Special Cell arrested a freelance journalist, Rajeev Sharma, on similar charges – raising alarm bells across the country’s security circles.[25] Many of his published pieces (articles and journalistic write-ups), favouring the CCP’s narratives in the Global Times and in Indian media outlets, flagged the gravity of the situation.[26]
Apart from claims that he was passing sensitive border information to China, the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) —Tibet’s Dharamsala-based government in exile — also accused him of publishing a series of fake, misleading articles targeting the institution of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and CTA leadership ‘.
India keen to stop China’s growing clout in its academia & cultural forums
As HEIs, RPOs, and democratic governments grapple with Chinese influence operations in their spaces in their ways, countries like the US and India – the two leading democracies – have been seriously considering preventive measures to contain China’s growing influence in their respective academic and media spaces. The US has embarked upon building regional Consortiums to help prevent licit and illicit exploitation of research and technology by malicious actors on the one hand while ensuring an open and accessible research environment on the other.[27] With China’s growing intent and low-key strategy to influence Indian HEIs and RPOs, as noted earlier, a disconcerted India has also been restricting academic collaborations with Beijing.[28]
In 2018, the President of the University of Texas rejected funding for the Chinese Public Policy Centre, fearing that it might compromise the University’s academic integrity[29]; India has also been discouraging CIs in Indian academic spaces, particularly since 2020.[30] The 2020 India and China face-off in the Galwan River valley in Ladakh pushed New Delhi to monitor and curb Chinese intrusions and interference wherever it deemed fit, including its academia. India has scrutinized the Chinese-funded programs and organizations functioning and operating in India.
The Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of External Affairs have both cautioned Indian colleges and universities against any academic cooperation with Chinese counterparts without prior government permission.[31] While deciding to review its over 54 existing MOUs with China, restrictions have also been applied to existing agreements, which cannot become operational until both Ministries approve them. The restrictive regulations cover educational exchange programs, contracts, Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs), and joint announcements of intent with Chinese institutions at private and publicly funded Indian universities. Post-Galwan standoff, India’s National Education Policy, administered by the Ministry of Education, also contemplated removing Mandarin from the suggested language list for students.[32]
Regarding the media, several regulations are underway, and measures include caps and conditions on foreign investment.[33] While the Press Council of India has also been mandated to build a Code of Conduct for news agencies, journalists, and newspapers, the law of India prohibits spreading or publishing fake news through social or mass media. It could lead to the imprisonment of journalists or newspaper bans.[34]
In terms of cultural forums, in August 2022, the India-China Friendship Association was forced to cancel a seminar titled ‘Interference of US Imperialist in the Internal Affairs of the People’s Republic of China’ after it sparked controversy and a prominent opposition leader in the state of Karnataka opposed it.[35]
Concluding Thoughts
China’s influence operations within academia highlight its strategic use of education, media, and cultural exchanges to manipulate narratives and cultivate favorable opinions. Beijing strategically targets students, academic institutions, media personnel, and think tanks through scholarships, Confucius Institutes, research collaborations, and talent recruitment programs. While such initiatives may appear benign, they carry underlying risks of propaganda and surveillance, with growing concerns about China’s intentions to reshape global and regional discourses. In India, the presence of Confucius Institutes and educational exchanges has raised red flags, particularly post-Galwan clashes, leading to heightened scrutiny and restricted collaborations. Beyond academia, Chinese efforts to sway public narratives through media partnerships and journalist fellowships further reveal a deliberate strategy to promote favourable views of the CCP.
To establish its global influence, China displays its superpower tendencies. Initially masking these ambitions, Beijing now pursues them more openly, aligning them with long-term goals, including its Belt and Road Initiative. As it seeks an expanded regional role, China’s influence-building operations in academia—both global and regional—are becoming increasingly conspicuous. India’s cautious responses reflect an urgent need to safeguard academic integrity and national interests against such covert attempts at narrative manipulation.
[1]Information Operations. (n.d.). RAND. https://www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html
[2] Joske, A. (2018). Picking flowers, making honey: The Chinese military’s collaboration with foreign universities. In Australian Strategic Policy Institute. International Cyber Centre Policy. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://www.aspi.org.au/report/picking-flowers-making-honey#:~:text=The%20PLA%20Daily%20uses%20the,to%20develop%20better%20military%20technology.&text=This%20is%20one%20aspect%20of,fusion’%20(%E5%86%9B%E6%B0%91%E8%9E%8D%E5%90%88).
[3] Palit, P. S. (2022). China’s ‘Influence Operations’ in Academia, Confucius Institutes and Soft Power: Strategic Responses of India, Bangladesh and Nepal (No. SAND2022-1249 O). Sandia National Laboratories. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://www.sandia.gov/app/uploads/sites/148/2022/02/SAND2022-1249O.pdf
[4] Ibid.
[5] “Confucius Institute U.S. Center” designation as a Foreign Mission – United States Department of State. (2020, December 1). United States Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/confucius-institute-u-s-center-designation-as-a-foreign-mission/
[6] Embassy of India, Beijing. (n.d.). https://www.eoibeijing.gov.in/eoibejing_pages/Mjc,
[7] Pandya, A. (2021, May 30). Has China’s propaganda machinery taken over global media? – The Sunday Guardian Live. The Sunday Guardian Live. https://sundayguardianlive.com/news/chinas-propaganda-machinery-taken-global-media#google_vignette
[8] Confucius Institute (Chinese Mandarin). (2019, July 9). Mumbai University – English. https://old.mu.ac.in/faculties/arts/languages-linguistics-literaure/confucius-institute-chinese-mandarin/#:~:text=%E2%80%8BTHE%20CONFUCIUS%20INSTITUTE%20WAS,AN%20AGREEMENT%20WITH%20HANBAN%2C%20CHINA.
[9] From Our Online Archive, & From Our Online Archive. (2012, May 15). Chinese language centre at Vellore Institute of Technology. The New Indian Express. https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-nadu/2009/Apr/07/chinese-language-centre-at-vellore-institute-of-technology-39057.html
[10] Global Times. (2020, August 6). India’s Chinese culture enthusiasts to suffer ‘decoupling’ brunt amid Confucius institutes review: observer. The Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1196953.shtml
[11] Scroll Staff. (2020, August 4). China asks India to treat Confucius Institutes teaching Mandarin in ‘fair manner’ amid review. Scroll.in. https://scroll.in/latest/969390/china-asks-india-to-treat-confucius-institutes-teaching-mandarin-in-fair-manner-amid-review
[12] LPU Chinese Language Centre Archives – Happenings@LPU. (2021, June 18). Happenings@LPU. https://happenings.lpu.in/tag/lpu-chinese-language-centre/
[13] Express News Service. (2022, April 29). India makes FCRA clearance mandatory for tie-ups with China’s Confucius Institutes. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/education/india-makes-fcra-clearance-mandatory-for-tie-ups-with-chinas-confucius-institutes-7891399/
[14] Palit, P. S. (2022). China’s ‘Influence Operations’ in Academia, Confucius Institutes and Soft Power: Strategic Responses of India, Bangladesh and Nepal (No. SAND2022-1249 O). Sandia National Laboratories. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://www.sandia.gov/app/uploads/sites/148/2022/02/SAND2022-1249O.pdf
[15] Shepherd, T. (2022, March 25). University students and staff face increasing threats, foreign interference inquiry finds. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/mar/25/university-students-and-staff-face-increasing-threats-foreign-interference-inquiry-finds
[16] Gauttam, Priya & Singh, Bawa & Chattu, Vijay Kumar. (2021). Higher Education as a Bridge between China and Nepal: Mapping Education as Soft Power in Chinese Foreign Policy. Societies. 11. 10.3390/soc11030081.
[17] Kalyan Raj Sharma: Contributor to China-Nepal Friendship. (2021, April 15). Fudan University. https://www.fudan.edu.cn/en/2021/0415/c344a108517/page.htm
[18] Freedom House. (2022). Authoritarian expansion and the power of democratic resilience. In Freedom House. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/beijing-global-media-influence/2022/authoritarian-expansion-power-democratic-resilience
[19] Palit, P. S. (2022, May 16). Parama Sinha palit. http://indiaworldview.com/perspective/the-china-influence-in-indian-academia/
[20] Zhang, K. V. (2019, January 22). Chinese non-military coercion—Tactics and rationale. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinese-non-military-coercion-tactics-and-rationale/
[21] India refuses to support China’s Belt and Road project at SCO meet. (2020, November 30). Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-doesn-t-join-sco-members-in-endorsing-china-s-belt-and-road-project/story-CBH22ODWVImRFpwkkhehWI.html
[22] Yang, W. (2020, March 16). Chinese propaganda reframes the coronavirus narrative. dw.com. https://www.dw.com/en/how-chinese-propaganda-is-reframing-the-coronavirus-narrative/a-52796337
[23] Krishnan, A. (2018, November 24). China is buying good press across the world, one paid journalist at a time. The Print. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://theprint.in/opinion/china-is-paying-foreign-journalists-including-from-india-to-report-from-beijing/154013/
[24] Mukhopadhyay, S. (2023, March 29). Is China running a secret propaganda operation with journalists in India? Mint. https://www.livemint.com/news/india/is-china-running-a-secret-propaganda-operation-in-india-journalists-get-tempting-offers-to-write-articles-11680051816402.html
[25] Arrested Delhi journalist Rajeev Sharma was passing info to the Chinese. (2020, September 19). The Hindu. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/arrested-scribe-rajeev-sharma-was-passing-info-on-border-strategy-to-chinese-intelligence-police/article32648112.ece
[26] Indian journalist who published disinformation targeting His Holiness the Dalai Lama and CTA arrested as Chinese spy. (2020, September 23). Central Tibetan Administration – Restoring Freedom for Tibetans. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://tibet.net/indian-journalist-who-published-disinformation-targeting-his-holiness-the-dalai-lama-and-cta-arrested-as-chinese-spy/
[27] Regional consortium efforts. (n.d.). Academic Research Security Program. https://rsec.sandia.gov/regional-consortium-efforts/
[28] Shrangi, V. (2023, February 9). Exclusive | Fearing Espionage, Govt to Restrict Educational Institutions from Academic Tie-Ups with Chinese. News18. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://www.news18.com/news/india/exclusive-fearing-espionage-govt-to-restrict-educational-institutions-from-academic-tie-ups-with-chinese-firms-7036723.html
[29] Rogin, J. (2018, January 14). University rejects Chinese Communist Party-linked influence efforts on campus. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/university-rejects-chinese-communist-party-linked-influence-efforts-on-campus/2018/01/14/c454b54e-f7de-11e7-beb6-c8d48830c54d_story.html
[30] Sen, S. R. (2020, August 21). India slaps new curbs on visas, universities to stem China influence: Report. Mint. https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-slaps-new-curbs-on-visas-universities-to-stem-china-influence-report-11598013487928.html
[31] India restricts university collaborations with China. (2019, October 10). University World News. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=2019101013182324
[32] Jebaraj, S. H. (2020, August 3). India to review Chinese language programmes across universities. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-to-review-chinese-language-programmes-across-universities/article32254737.ece
[33] Viswanath, N., Kazia, N. A., Sanghavi, N., & Adhikari, R. (2022, June 24). In brief: media law and regulation in India. Lexology. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=225d5e03-f14c-492f-b2a4-c55f49a063d1
[34] Home | Press Council of India. (n.d.). https://www.presscouncil.nic.in/Norms.aspx
[35] Express News Service. (2022b, August 27). India-China Friendship Association calls off seminar after Siddaramaiah declines invitation. The New Indian Express. Retrieved October 29, 2024, from https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/karnataka/2022/aug/28/india-china-friendship-association-calls-off-seminar-after-siddaramaiah-declines-invitation-2492194.html
© Dr. Parama Sinha Palit & Tejusvi Shukla
Dr Parama Sinha Palit is the author of the New Media and Public Diplomacy: Political Communication in India, the United States and China and Analyzing China’s Soft Power Strategy and Comparative Indian Initiatives. She is also the Co-Chair of Consortium for Research Security in Asia (CRSA).
Tejusvi Shukla is a PhD Scholar at OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat. Her research focuses on issues of National Security, particularly Cognitive Warfare.