Dr Ashok Sharma – India’s Renewable Energy Geopolitics: Commitments, Pathways and the Hard Realities

Sharma LE Mag Dec 2025

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Live Encounters Magazine December 2025

India’s Renewable Energy Geopolitics: Commitments, Pathways
and the Hard Realities, by Dr Ashok Sharma.


Image courtesy Observer Research Foundation
Image courtesy Observer Research Foundation

Abstract

India’s renewable-energy transition has become both a domestic imperative and a central axis of its international posture. Having pledged net-zero by 2070 and set ambitious capacity goals — notably a 500 GW non-fossil target for 2030 — New Delhi now frames its clean-energy drive as an instrument of economic development, industrial policy and diplomatic influence. Yet this ambition sits alongside continued reliance on coal, contested domestic finance and system challenges, and a geopolitics shaped by supply-chain dependencies, technology access and carbon-border politics.

At COP30 India has emphasised adaptation and demanded large, concessional climate finance for the Global South, while rolling out policies to expand transmission, incentivise carbon capture and develop green hydrogen. This article examines what India has committed, how it is pursuing those commitments, the domestic and international obstacles it confronts, and the geopolitical consequences of its strategy. By situating policy instruments and diplomatic manoeuvres together, the piece argues that India’s leadership will depend on aligning credible domestic deeds with equitable international bargains.

Introduction:

India’s rapid rise as a renewable-energy power is a defining story of twenty-first-century climate politics. Over the past decade New Delhi has vaulted from a peripheral actor in low-carbon diplomacy to a convenor of South-South initiatives, most visibly through the International Solar Alliance and its high-profile pledges at successive COPs. The government has set ambitious numerical targets, built large-scale auction programmes and mobilised domestic manufacturing incentives. Yet, as 2025 closes, the promise of India’s renewable revolution is entwined with hard choices: the need to guarantee reliable, affordable electricity for hundreds of millions; a still-substantial coal fleet; international pressures from carbon-border mechanisms and supply-chain politics; and the practicalities of financing and grid integration. This article traces India’s commitments, the instruments it is deploying, the obstacles it faces at home and abroad, and the geopolitical implications of its renewable quest.

What India has committed

India’s headline climate commitment remains the pledge made by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at COP26: a target of net-zero greenhouse-gas emissions by 2070, accompanied by interim commitments to expand non-fossil energy capacity and reduce carbon intensity.[1] Domestically, the government has repeatedly framed a target of achieving 500 gigawatts (GW) of non-fossil power capacity by 2030, and has emphasised increasing the share of non-fossil capacity in the electricity mix to 50 per cent or more.[2] By mid-2025 India had already crossed a significant milestone: non-fossil sources accounted for roughly half of installed power capacity, placing the country on a more ambitious trajectory than many had expected.[3]

Beyond quantities, New Delhi has announced structural and institutional initiatives to facilitate the transition. A large Transmission Plan has been presented to link renewable-rich regions — primarily in western and northern states — with demand centres, under the rubric of Green Energy Corridors. The government is also backing nascent industries such as electrolytic green hydrogen through Production-linked Incentives (PLIs), and pursuing domestic manufacturing of solar components to reduce import dependence. Finally, recognising the difficulty of completely phasing out fossil fuels in the short term, authorities in 2025 signalled sizeable incentives for Carbon Capture Utilisation and Storage (CCUS) pilot projects, with support levels that could cover significant shares of project costs.[4]

How India is pursuing these goals — policy instruments and practice

India’s strategy for scaling renewables is multi-pronged: auctions for large utility projects; state and central procurement mechanisms; fiscal incentives for domestic manufacturing; grid investment; and nascent market instruments for storage and long-duration firming.

Auctions remain the principal delivery mechanism for large-scale solar and wind. Competitive bidding has historically driven down tariff levels and attracted private capital. Complementing auctions are industrial incentives: the government’s PLIs for domestic manufacturing are intended to build a homegrown solar-PV and electrolyser industry, addressing both jobs and strategic supply-chain vulnerabilities.

Grid investment has emerged as the critical bottleneck. To unlock the envisaged 500 GW, India has announced a multi-year transmission investment plan aimed at delivering high-capacity interconnections between renewables hubs in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Ladakh to major load centres.[5] Without this infrastructure, projects face curtailment, long transmission waits and the familiar friction of interstate power allocation.

On the technology front India is pursuing a pragmatic mix. Battery storage deployment is being encouraged via regulatory frameworks and tenders, while green hydrogen — still capital-intensive — is promoted through subsidies and public-private partnerships intended to anchor a nascent domestic industry. In sectors that are hard to electrify (steel, cement), policymakers see CCUS as a necessary bridging technology and have proposed fiscal incentives to accelerate demonstrations.[6]

The gap between ambition and delivery

Despite impressive headline figures, a range of signs reveal a distance between targets and implementation. First, project delivery has been uneven: a notable share of renewable tenders have been undersubscribed or cancelled due to complex tender designs, transmission constraints, and uncertain off-take arrangements.[7] These operational frictions have left a pipeline of unsigned power purchase agreements exceeding tens of gigawatts, which poses a real risk to investor confidence.

Second, financing remains a constraint. While many utility-scale projects are bankable, financing adaptation, distributed renewables for rural resilience, and long-duration storage requires concessional capital and tailored instruments. That need is part of India’s diplomatic message at COP30, where leaders emphasised that adaptation finance should be predictable, accessible and concessional rather than market-rate debt that deepens fiscal burdens.[8]

Third, grid flexibility and market design lag behind capacity ambitions. Higher shares of variable renewables require improved forecasting, regional balancing, ancillary markets and demand-side management. India has begun regulatory reforms, but implementing changes across states with divergent political economies is a slow process.

Finally, the government’s parallel plans to expand thermal capacity complicate the transition story. Reports in 2024–25 indicated policies to add substantial coal and lignite capacity to ensure energy security and reliability as electricity demand grows — a choice justified on development grounds but one that raises questions about emissions pathways and lock-in.[9] The concomitant policy to subsidise CCUS is a pragmatic attempt to reconcile this, yet CCUS’s high costs and uncertain scaling prospects make it a contested bet.[10]

Geopolitical dimensions: supply chains, trade measures and diplomacy

India’s renewable ambition has an overt geopolitical dimension. First, the global solar and battery supply chains have long been dominated by China. India’s attempts to build domestic manufacturing are in part a strategic response to that concentration: reducing import dependence is seen as a matter of energy security, local industrialisation and geopolitical autonomy.[11] However, establishing deep, competitive supply chains requires time, significant capital and technological partnerships.

Second, Carbon-Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAMs) and equivalent policies in Europe and elsewhere create a new layer of trade conditionality. As consumers and markets insist on low-carbon credentials, Indian exporters — particularly in energy-intensive sectors such as steel — face the prospect of new costs unless they decarbonise or obtain exemptions.[12] India has therefore invested political capital in seeking carve-outs, equivalence pathways and technology cooperation to help its industries remain competitive.

Third, the diplomacy of finance and technology has intensified. India’s COP30 interventions emphasised adaptation and called for large concessional flows from developed countries; ministers argued that the world must mobilise “trillions, not billions” for vulnerable countries.[13] These demands reflect both an equity principle and a fiscal reality: many adaptation measures are public goods unattractive to private capital. India’s negotiating strategy has therefore been to bind climate ambition to development partnerships — bilaterally (with Japan, the EU, the United States, and the Gulf states) and plurilaterally through initiatives such as the International Solar Alliance.

Finally, partnerships are shifting. The United States, European Union, Japan and Gulf states are all active in offering finance, technology and co-production deals. New Delhi seeks arrangements that prioritise co-production and joint manufacturing — not unilateral transfers — to build domestic capacity while protecting IP-linked innovation incentives.

Domestic politics and institutional challenges

India’s renewable push is also entangled with internal politics. States differ in their resource endowments, industrial priorities and fiscal capacities, creating a complex federal dynamic for transmission planning, land allocation and offtake contracts. Political leaders must balance the imperative of clean energy with the electoral salience of affordable, uninterrupted power. Moreover, land acquisition, environmental clearances and local social objections continue to delay projects.

Institutional capacity, particularly at the Distribution Company (DISCOM) level, is another constraint. DISCOM financial health affects their ability to sign long-term PPAs and honour payments, which in turn influences developers’ bankability. Though reforms and recapitalisation efforts have been ongoing, the legacy of stressed utilities complicates large-scale procurement.

Paths forward and policy priorities

If India is to reconcile its climate diplomacy with domestic delivery, several priorities are apparent. First, fast-tracking transmission and regional balancing will be decisive; without robust interconnection curtailment and bottlenecks will sap investor confidence. Second, blended finance that uses concessional public capital to leverage private investment for adaptation, storage and green hydrogen can mobilise needed flows. Third, carefully designed CCUS pilots with clear success metrics and sunset clauses can test the technology without perpetuating fossil lock-in. Fourth, trade diplomacy must be proactive: negotiating equivalence mechanisms and technical assistance to meet CBAM-like rules can protect exporters while accelerating decarbonisation.

India’s renewable strategy is as much about industrial policy and development as it is about climate. If New Delhi can pair clear domestic measures — conditional National Determined Contributions (NDC) elements tied to finance, transparent adaptation budgets, time-bound CCUS demonstrations and aggressive grid investments — with an international bargain that supplies concessional finance and technology co-production, its claim to leadership will be credible and constructive.

Conclusion: ambition, realism and geopolitics

India’s renewable transition is an unfinished but consequential project. It combines genuine technological progress and industrial ambition with profound governance and financing challenges. The country’s diplomacy at forums such as COP30 underscores a central reality: the global energy transition will not be achieved by technocratic targets alone but through negotiated bargains that recognise historic responsibility, current capacities and future development needs. For India, the test is to turn rhetorical leadership into verifiable domestic action and to translate international commitments into partnerships that bolster both energy security and decarbonisation. Success would make India a model of climate diplomacy for the Global South; failure would risk widening the gap between promise and performance — with consequences not only for India, but for the international climate order itself.

[1] Climate Action Tracker, “Net Zero Targets — India,” Climate Action Tracker,   https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india/net-zero-targets/ (accessed November 21, 2025)

[2] Ministry of New and Renewable Energy , Government of India, “India Reframes Its Renewable Revolution:  The Next Big Leap from Speed to System Strength for Viksit Bharat,” Press Information Bureau, October 22, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2181433 .

[3] “India hits 50% non-fossil power milestone ahead of 2030 clean energy target,” Reuters, July 14, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/india-hits-50-non-fossil-power-milestone-ahead-2030-clean-energy-target-2025-07-14/

[4]  Sethuraman NR, “India to offer large carbon capture incentives as coal remains major part of energy mix,” Reuters, September 11, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/india-offer-large-carbon-capture-incentives-coal-remains-major-part-energy-mix-2025-09-11/

[5]  “India Reframes Its Renewable Revolution, n. 2.

[6]  Sonali Mukherjee, “India to Launch National Carbon Capture Initiative,” Outlook Business, September 12, 2025, https://www.outlookbusiness.com/planet/industry/india-carbon-capture-incentives-coal-transition

[7] Sethuraman N R  “India’s renewable energy sector hit by weak demand, cancellations, report says,” Reuters, March 6, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/indias-renewable-energy-sector-hit-by-weak-demand-cancellations-report-says-2025-03-06/

[8]  Anton L. Delgado and Sibi Arasu, “India delays climate pledge, pressures rich nations on funding at UN climate talks,” Associate Press, November 20, 2025,   https://apnews.com/article/cbf0e66e2aca48a5b4c2bc3c3e91bff9

[9]  “India hits 500 GW installed power, over 50% from non-fossil sources,” Enerdata , October 31, 2025, https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/india-hits-500-gw-installed-power-over-50-non-fossil-sources.html

[10]  Prakash Sharma, Roshna N, Mihir Vora and Harshul Kanwar,“India net-zero path and CCUS analysis,” Wood Mackenzie, January 2024  (accessed November 21, 2025), https://www.woodmac.com/horizons/india-net-zero-path/

[11] “Renewable Capacity Statistics 2025,” International Renewable Energy Agency, Abu Dhabi, March 2025, (accessed November 21, 2025), https://www.irena.org/Publications/2025/Mar/Renewable-capacity-statistics-2025

[12] “Carbon Competitiveness: India at the Net Zero-Trade Nexus,”  Net Zero Tracker , July 24, 2025, https://ca1-nzt.edcdn.com/PDFs-and-Excels/Carbon_Competitiveness_India_Net_Zero_Trade_Nexus_24_Jul_2025.pdf?v=1753285279

[13] David Stringer, “Rich Nations Must Hit Net Zero and Pay Up on Climate, India Says,” Bloomberg, November 18, 2025,  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-11-18/rich-nations-must-hit-net-zero-and-pay-up-on-climate-india-says


© Dr Ashok Sharma

Dr. Ashok Sharma is a Visiting Fellow at the University of New South Wales Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy and an Academic Fellow of the Australia-India Institute at the University of Melbourne.

 

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